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The New World Order, having emerged from the finalization of the Cold War, 
has been determined by the consolidation of the United States hegemony, the 
generalization of market-oriented policies and the financial globalization 
throughout the world. Governments from diverse political orientation adopted so-
called market-oriented policies, which in the countries of the South have centered 
on a curb on public expenditure, the elimination of social subsidies and the 
withdrawal of social safety nets, the privatization of state-owned companies, 
and the setting of appropriate conditions for foreign investment. The international 
development architecture, designed by the most powerful economies and the 
global economic institutions, namely the World Trade Organization (WTO), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), has concentrated 
its policies toward developing and under-developed countries on the fulfillment 
of such priorities.   
For Latin America and the Andean Region, this new trend has represented an 
intensification of the economic and political domination of the United States. The 
implementation of the neo-liberal agenda in the region during the eighties and 
the nineties was instrumental in the consolidation of the political and military 
power and in the economic recovery of the US, as well as in its good 
performance during the nineties. However, starting from the year 2001, at the 
beginning of the Bush administration, the economy of the country was confronted 
again with signs of recession.    
Against this international context, from the beginning of the new century a trend 
marked by the emergence of social and political movements, their electoral 
triumph, and their consolidation as alternative governments, is apparent in Latin 
America and more specifically in the Andean Region. Such a trend reflects the 
unrest of important sectors of the population due to the social and economic crisis 
experienced by most of the countries. Thus, in December, 1998, Hugo Chávez 
won the presidential elections in Venezuela, as the leader of the 5th Republic 
Movement, and a few years after he initiated the Bolivarian Revolution. After 
winning several elections, in January 2007, he announced the implementation of 
so-called Socialism for the 21st Century, a project which corresponds to the 
process of radicalization experienced by the Venezuelan regime within these 
years. More to the south, in Ecuador, in January 2003, colonel Lucio Gutiérrez 
initiated its government, after winning the presidential election with the support 
of the Conaie (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) and its 
political party, Pachakutik; however, by mid 2004, a strong social unrest forced 
the president to step down, due to the fact that he betrayed the compromises 
agreed upon with the social movement, and became a close collaborator of the 
American strategies in the region. Later on, in January 2007 in the same country, 
the inauguration of Rafael Correa took place, bringing new hope for social and 
political change. A year earlier, on January 22nd, 2006, Evo Morales, in front of 
an electoral alliance headed by the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo), was 
inaugurated as the first indigenous president in Latin America.  
In the mean time, in Colombia the political wave was moving in an opposite 
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direction. In May 2006 Álvaro Uribe Vélez was re-elected for his second 
presidential term, a fact that strengthened his role as the main ally of the United 
States in South America and as its stronghold for its strategies in a shaken 
Andean Region. From the beginning of his first term, the Colombian president 
has attempted to consolidate an extremely authoritarian project, strongly 
committed to neo-liberal policies. This project was legitimized by the rejection of 
most of the population to the widespread climate of violence of the country and 
to the abuses that the guerrillas inflicted on the civilian population. However, the 
links of the government with the paramilitary organizations and its strengthening 
from the top levels of the central state, have generated the questioning and 
opposition of diverse social and political organizations and institutions, from 
within the country and abroad. In spite of the obstacles posed by such a policy 
for the development of political alternatives, the emergence and consolidation 
of the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), as a coalition of all the democratic 
and civilian organizations from the left took place in Colombia in 2005.  The 
gaining of strength that the PDA was to experience reflects the discontent of 
significant sectors of the population with the political and social project of the 
government.  It was also influenced by the experiences of the alternative 
governments in the neighboring countries. 
The present paper states that the operationalisation of American strategies in 
the Andean Region - centered in Colombia - has exacerbated the problems of 
the region, which has resulted in an acute social and political polarization. The 
extremes of such a contradiction are the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, on the one side; and the Colombian and Peruvian governments with the 
support of Washington, on the other side.  Taking as a context the complex 
regional interplay  presented here, this article is aimed at analyzing the effects 
of the current international order and of American hegemony in the Andean 
Region, as well as the bring to bear the perspective of development of these 
countries, with respect to two issues: 1) The struggle against drugs and terrorism, 
its social and economic effects, and its connection with the control over territories 
and strategic resources and, 2) the deepening of the neo-liberal model through 
the Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) and the IMF programs imposed on 
the countries. 
As has been stated, the Colombian case is important in this analysis because 
Colombia is at the core of the American anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist strategy 
for the entire region. The Venezuelan case is fundamental, given the stance of 
the country against the American initiatives in the region, its exploration of 
alternatives for economic and social development, and for regional integration, 
and the importance of its oil production.  
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first one, some theoretical 
approaches that have developed regarding the Andean Region and its 
relationship with the United States are analyzed; the second part examines the 
main components of the National Security Strategy of the United States and its 
policies for the Andean Region; the third part is centered on the economic 
strategy of the US in the Andean Region. The search and control of oil and the 
trade bilateral agreements agreed upon with some Andean countries will also 
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be examined in this part. Finally, in the fourth part, some key strategies of the 
alternative governments of Venezuela and Bolivia, regarding regional 
integration, are presented.   
     
I. The Andean Region and the United States: main theoretical approaches 
 Academic studies developed in the aftermath of 9-11 about the relationship 
between the United States and the Andean Region, and particularly about  
American interests in the region, have emphasized “securitization” issues and 
the struggle against terrorism as priorities stemming from the Strategy of 
National Security of the United States. In this regard, an important body of 
literature has developed in recent years. However, other components of this 
strategy, such as economic and trade issues, including the deepening of neo-
liberal policies, have not been examined in this regard. Most of the time, 
security and economic interests are considered as separate issues. 
Scholars do not agree on the level of priority that the Andean Region holds 
for the US. In general terms, there is a trend to minimize the importance of the 
region and of the Latin American countries as a whole, regarding the interests 
of the United States after 9-11 (Monica Hirst, 2003; Francisco Leal, 2003). 
However, it is clear that, although the main focus of the security strategy of 
the US currently rests on the Middle East and Asia (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan), 
the Andean Region is a decisive and conflictive zone for American interests, as 
will be explained later.    
Regarding regional security in the Andes, academic and political approaches 
cover a wide spectrum - from the most conservative, linked to modernization-
type theories, to more critical stances, derived from the Dependency School 
and other historical-structural approaches. The first have emphasized the 
failure of local elites and have claimed a key role for the United States; while 
the second have questioned the US’s interventionist policies in the region. 
Within the first group, Francisco Leal, a well-known Colombian analyst, states 
that the US has imposed its unilateral vision regarding security to the Andean 
countries partly because the region has no valid national or regional 
interlocutors, able to put forward viable alternatives. According to this author, 
atomization, provincialism and the national chauvinism of the political classes 
have prevailed, as well as a public opinion that is almost always manipulated. 
However, he thinks that the region can rely on the opportunity given by its 
instability, and, with the participation of the United States, develop a regional 
project of security that puts forward the national security projects of the 
military (Leal, 2003:154). 
For her part, Martha Ardila states that, from the second half of the nineties, 
border security acquired a special connotation, becoming the axis of the 
relationship of the neighboring countries with Colombia. In this way, issues such 
as drug trafficking, terrorism, and weapon trafficking gained in security 
importance. These issues became a priority, particularly given the perception 
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and fear that held pertaining to Colombian instability - a fear that has 
deepened with the Plan Colombia, the aerial aspersions, and the increasing 
displaced population to both Ecuador and Venezuela (Ardila, 2002: 321).  
Within the second perspective mentioned above, Noam Chomsky has insisted 
on the possibility that the next objective of the Bush doctrine of preventive 
war might be the Andean Region, given the fact that it is an important source 
of natural resources for the United States that is almost out of its control. As 
the region is surrounded by several American military bases and hosts an 
important military force of this country, Washington could possibly argue that 
the region itself represents a terrorist threat (Chomsky, 2003). According to 
Chomsky, this situation has aggravated due to the fact that the Colombian 
crisis has expanded significantly towards the other Andean countries, 
especially Venezuela and Ecuador. Thus, the expansion of this conflict and the 
border situation heightens the possibility of American intervention and of the 
deployment of military strategies developed in Colombia to increase the 
spectrum of action of the US in the entire region.   
In this same regard, the Brazilian scholar Monica Hirst acknowledges that, in 
so far as the Andean countries represent the key centre of most of those issues 
perceived as threats in the hemisphere for the United States, and taking into 
account that the very concept of hemispheric security has been adjusted and 
reduced to the immediate strategic security objectives of the US –the struggle 
against terrorism- it is almost impossible to ignore the ramifications of its 
Strategy of National Security on the Andean countries and their foreign 
policies (Hirst, 2003:38).      
For his part, the Ecuadorian analyst Alexis Ponce states that the Andean 
Regional Initiative is just a pretext, on the part of the Bush administration,  to 
control the natural resources of the region. The objective of this strategy is to 
exercise ‘territorial, military, economic, political and social control in the 
Andean-Amazon basin, due to its richness in natural resources: oil, gold, 
diverse minerals, precious stones, wood, plants and exotic animals, but, before 
everything, water, oxygen, genetic biodiversity and ancestral cultures’ (Ponce, 
2002:243).           
The theoretical approach of this paper corresponds to the latter perspective. 
The author considers that the analysis of the policies derived from the 
Strategy of National Security of the US for the Andean Region must be 
undertaken within the specific context of the New World Order, marked by a 
strong economic and trade competition among the most industrialized 
countries and an increasing interventionist stance on the part of the US in the 
countries of the Andean Region. In this regard, an approach that takes into 
account the impact of international decisions and policies and their interaction 
with domestic conditions, is very much required to study the issues posed. The 
idea is not to put the blame on the international order and the US for the 
economic and social crisis of the countries studied, but to see how these 
international factors have increased historical constraints for national 
development in the region. As Barbara Stallings posits with regard to the 
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disregard by mainstream analysis for the dependency approach: ‘Ironically, 
in the moment in which the international variables became more relevant, 
during the eighties, such statements (stemming from dependency approach) 
were no longer considered as key factors of development’ (Stallings, 
1992:61). No doubt, this consideration has been still more valid during the 
past lustrum. 
The analytical approach followed in this paper stems from the Marxist 
tradition as embodied in the dependency approach. The processes will be 
compared as complex structures in which political, economic, and social issues 
are interconnected and interdependent, among each others. This approach 
allows for the analysis of the specific processes in the Andean Region as the 
result of the interaction between the international, the regional, and the 
national conditions in the period under consideration.        
 
II. The National Security Strategy of the United States and the Andean 
Region 
A.    The National Security Strategy and its priorities 
A year after 9-11, US president Bush presented and got the approval by 
Congress of the National Security Strategy of the United States. The 
announcement of this strategy, best known as the Bush Doctrine, was 
considered by various academic and political sectors as an open declaration 
of hegemony on the part of the United States.  
 Regarding the security of the nation and the struggle against terrorism, the 
document states that, ‘as a matter of common sense and self defense, America 
will act against such emerging threats, before they are fully formed. (…) In 
the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the 
path of action’. And also adds: ‘In leading the campaign against terrorism, we 
are forging new, productive international relationships and redefining existing 
ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-first century’.  This 
justification of the so-called pre-emptive attack, which allows the United 
States to intervene anywhere in the world if its national interests seem to be 
at risk, appears to be the most known and questioned component of the 
American strategy.  
 However, the Bush Doctrine is also very specific regarding the priority of 
free-market policies and announces a comprehensive strategy to achieve 
free-trade agreements with all the countries of the world. In the same vein, the 
document reaffirms the U.S. commitment to work with the IMF in order to 
streamline the policy conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy 
on achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and monetary policy, 
exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy. The National Strategy also 
reflects the decision of the U.S. to strengthen its energy security by working 
with oil producers to ‘expand the sources and types of global energy 
supplied, especially in the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and the 
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Caspian region’. On this crucial issue, the Strategy confirms a priority already 
set in the report of the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEP), 
published on May 17, 2001, under the orientation of Richard Cheney, current 
Vice-president of the United States. Thus, the neo-liberal strategy and its 
ramifications are considered here as part and parcel of the Bush Doctrine. 
 According to the American analyst Michel Klare, in addition to the war 
against terrorism, Bush has dedicated much attention to two strategic 
priorities: the modernization and expansion of the military apparatus and  
access to new sources of oil abroad. Even though initially they were different, 
these two objectives were finally merged, ‘giving way to a unique strategic 
design which today guides the foreign policy of the U.S.’ (Klare, 2003:64). 
Thus, once the political, military and ideological confrontation of the Cold 
War disappeared, the economic dispute among industrialized countries 
acquired more relevance. In such a situation, the control over strategic natural 
resources turned fundamental, as Klare puts it:   
The wars of resource during the post-Cold War are not isolated or 
aleatory events. On the contrary, they must be understood within a 
wider geopolitical framework (…) The wars of the future will be 
aimed at the possession and control of essential economic goods and 
particularly of the necessary resources for the functioning of modern 
industrial societies (Klare, 2001: 183).  
In this regard, the United States is the most dependent on oil imports of all the 
industrialized countries. In 2002, the country was importing 60 percent of the 
oil it needed and it was calculated that this proportion would increase to 90 
percent by the year 2020. According to Alberto Negri, the main problems to 
be solved by the superpower are the continuity and security in oil supplies, the 
control over the reserves, the diversification of sources, reducing the 
dependency on the Persian Gulf, and the maintenance of low costs in 
extraction (Negri, 2003:51).  Besides the preservation of its global economic 
power, the US seeks to maintain the control of the main oil sources in the 
world, as a strategy to exercise its power over its main economic rivals, 
Europe, Japan and China.  
In addition to the control over petroleum, the military industry and expenses 
are fundamental to the consolidation of the hegemonic power of the US, which 
is the most powerful country in human history, leads in weapon production, 
and is the country with the biggest military budget in the world. No doubt, the 
military expenditure has been decisive for the reactivation of the economy of 
the country after periods of recession. 
B.  The political and military strategies of the United States in the Andean 
Region 
Regarding the importance of the Andean countries as oil exporters for the US, 
the Italian analyst Guglielmo Ragozzino, basing his argument on official data 
from the American government, states that in the year 2000 the main 
providers of oil to the U.S. were Canada, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and 
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Venezuela. Within the ten main providers were also Nigeria, Iran and 
Colombia (Ragozzino, 2003:57). According to data from 2002 collected by 
Ivan Ivekovic, the American oil imports from Venezuela, Colombia and 
Ecuador were larger than those of the Persian Gulf as a whole. Venezuela 
was then the fifth oil producer of the world, is one of the founders of the 
OPEC and its oil reserves are about 77,7 thousand million barrels. The US 
market absorbs around 59 percent of the Venezuelan oil, which in turn 
accounts for between 13 and 17 per cent of the US needs. Colombia´s 
proven reserves are about 1.7 thousand million barrels. In addition, potential 
sources, particularly those from the border with Venezuela and the 
department of Putumayo to the south (near the border with Ecuador) are  
very important.  Ecuador has proven reserves of 2.1 thousand million barrels. 
Most of its oil production is located east of the Amazon region, in the province 
of Oriente (Ivekovic, 2003:49).   
The National Security Strategy and the consolidation of the global U.S. 
hegemony have raised new challenges to the Andean Region pivoted around 
American strategic interests. With reference to Andean regional conflicts, the 
American National Strategy document states: ‘We have developed an active 
strategy to help the Andean nations adjust their economies, enforce their laws, 
defeat terrorist organizations, and cut off the supply of drugs’. Such strategy 
is materialised in some initiatives, namely the Andean Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA), and the severe fiscal adjustment programs derived from the accords 
established with the International Monetary Fund, on the one hand, and the 
Plan Colombia, the Andean Regional Initiative and the Plan Patriota, on the 
other. 
Although the latter three strategies above (Plan Colombia, Andean Regional 
Initiative and Plan Patriota) are presented as political initiatives, all of them 
include a strong economic and social component, aimed at the deepening of 
the neo-liberal agenda, especially the one related to the promotion of a 
severe fiscal adjustment and the reduction of public and social investment. All 
of these strategies privilege the implementation of the U.S. sponsored 
Program to Eradicate Illicit Crops by Aerial Spraying of the Herbicide 
Glyphosate (PECIG), a highly controversial program for its negative health 
and environmental consequences, especially in the south of Colombia and on 
both sides of the border between Colombia and Ecuador. The destruction of 
either illicit and licit crops by this program and the increasing forced 
displacement of Colombian peasants to the neighboring countries, as a 
consequence of such policy, have had a deep social and economic impact on 
Colombia and the other countries involved.   
In addition, the implementation of the three strategies above was based on 
military confrontation with the guerrillas and restricts the possibilities of public 
investment by the Colombian state, given the fact that, in order to meet the 
objectives of the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorist strategy, a strong 
military expenditure is mandatory. Moreover, it is clear that the military 
strategy, especially in the Amazon region and on the border with Venezuela, 
is very much connected with the search and control over strategic natural 
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resources, mainly petroleum and biodiversity. Although some of these 
strategies precede the promulgation of the National Security Strategy, they 
fit into the new strategic priorities established by the U.S.  
The ‘Plan Colombia’ was conceived of and put in practice by the American 
administration in 1999, during the terms of William Clinton and Andrés 
Pastrana, in America and Colombia respectively, as the administration’s main 
anti-narcotics strategy. From the beginning it aroused strong national and 
international controversy. The project became more aggressive and military-
driven after the first inauguration of George Bush in America, and, later on, 
of Álvaro Uribe Vélez in Colombia, as Pastrana´s successor.  Although it was 
presented as a ‘Plan for peace, prosperity and strengthening of the state’, 
and as a panacea for all the perceived problems of the country, its 
implementation exacerbated internal conflict in Colombia, which conflict was 
to extend beyond the borders of the country. 
It is important to make clear that this Plan was elaborated by a commission of 
the American government and was discussed and approved in the American 
Congress before it was even known in Colombia. It was written in English and 
only after its approval, the Spanish version was presented. Its approval was 
preceded by strong lobbying on the part of big American companies, 
particularly providers of military products and services, who where anxious to 
get a big share of the resources assigned to the country. It has to be taken 
into account that Colombia is the first receptor of military aid from the 
Western Hemisphere, which for some scholars explains the unconditional 
stance of the Colombian presidents to the American strategies in the region, 
especially during the past decade.  
However, going beyond the military aspect, it is clear that the anti-narcotics 
strategy of Plan Colombia, which is centred in the aerial aspersion of toxic 
products such as glifosate or Round-Up, has generated strong opposition 
inside the country and abroad. Large zones from the south of the country have 
been affected, as well as other territories with coca and poppy crops. The 
impact of this strategy on the living conditions and health of the population 
and the destruction of the environment; of the survival of crops and/or the 
sources of water, not only in Colombia but also in the border territories of 
Ecuador, has been a continuous source of political and diplomatic problems 
within and between the two countries. The government of Correa has filed a 
law suit against the Colombian government in the Organization of American 
States, due to Colombia’s insistence on continuing with the aerial eradication 
of illicit crops. Worth mentioning too is the strong impact on social conditions 
of the region, manifested in the increasing forced displacement of complete 
families to neighboring countries, but especially to Ecuador.  
As a matter of fact, the Andean Regional Initiative, announced by Bush in 
April, 2001, was initially intended to extend the anti-narcotics strategy of the 
Plan Colombia to the country´s neighbors, including Brazil and Panama. It was 
conceived of as the strategy of the three Ds: Democracy, Development and 
Drugs. However, after the launching of the anti-terrorist strategy, this project 
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has concentrated on the creation of a type of wall of contention at the 
borders and has increased - in a significant way - the military build-up of the 
countries that are more affected by the exacerbation of the Colombian 
conflict and its effects: Ecuador and Venezuela.  
According to official documents from the United States government, the 
Andean Region is important due to the following reasons: First, its three main 
drug-producer countries, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, account for the 100 per 
cent of the cocaine and the 60 per cent of the heroine entering the American 
market. Second, the region includes three important oil producers: Venezuela, 
Colombia and Ecuador. Third, the United States is the main trade partner of 
all the Andean countries, and, fourth, some of the most populated countries of 
Latin America are located in the region. 
It is important to take into account that in the Strategy of National Security of 
the U.S. it is clearly stated that, although poverty does not convert its sufferers 
into terrorists and assassins, such a condition, in addition to weak institutions 
and corruption, can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and 
drug cartels within their borders. In this sense, some of the Andean countries 
have been considered as weak or ‘failed states’, from an institutional, social 
and economic point of view.  
Finally, the ‘Plan Patriota’ (Patriot Plan) was conceived of by the American 
and the Colombian administrations as the biggest military operation during 
the past four decades, against the FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed 
Forces), the main guerrilla organization of the country. This plan was 
developed starting in May 2004, in a territory of 260.000 km2 in the south 
of the country. This region corresponds to 20 per cent of the national territory 
and is a strategic one, due to its natural resources, especially the biodiversity, 
water and oil, and for being the main scenario of the war for the territorial 
control among the state army, the paramilitary and the guerrilla.  
The participation of American mercenaries and troops in the Plan Patriota has 
been significant. It was conducted as a secret operation by the two 
governments, and at the end of 2006, information to the effect that the Plan 
had concluded was proffered, but no additional information or explanation 
was given. The Plan anticipated a contribution of 110 million dollars in three 
years, on the part of the US, for training, weapon acquisition, and 
communication equipment for the elite brigades of the Army. For the country, 
the Plan represented an extraordinary economic lift of about 7 percent of the 
GDP. 
Although there is official propaganda about the positive results of Plan 
Patriota, the Plan’s results have in fact been very controversial, even within 
some sectors of the government. Alfredo Rangel, an important military analyst 
very close to the Uribe administration, stated that the military seemed to have 
gotten it wrong with respect to the place and the time for the operation, given 
that with the same resources they could have developed military operations in 
many regions of the country, in order to strike the guerrillas in more important 
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and populated places.    
At this point, it is important to give some attention to two important documents 
which explain the perception of the risks posed by the Andean Region, and 
particularly Colombia, to the national security interests of the United States. 
The first one is a report issued by an Independent Commission sponsored by 
the Council on Foreign Relations of the United States, named Andes 2020: A 
New Strategy for the Challenge of Colombia and the Region. The second 
document to be considered here is the Testimony of General James T. Hill, the 
then United States Southern Commander, which represents the official stance 
of the Bush administration towards security issues in the Andean Region.  
In the Andes report, which paradoxically has not generated any significant 
academic or political reactions in these countries, it is stated that the Andean 
Region, with more than 120 million people living in its five countries, is a peril 
and its security crisis ‘is the most significant in the Western Hemisphere, one 
that exacts a direct toll on American lives and interests’. According to the 
report, democracy in the region is at risk as a consequence of various factors, 
which are the following: destabilizing levels of inequality and poverty; 
impunity regarding human rights violations; weak political institutions; outright 
corruption; elusive commitments to the rule of law; and lack of state control 
over parts of the territory. In addition, the region, the report states, 
experiences concentration of political and economic power; exclusion of rural 
populations; violent conflict; and transnational threat to security, nourished by 
drugs and other illegal industries, criminals, illegal armed groups and drug 
dealers.  
In such a context, Colombia appears as the axis of the problem, given its 
location, economic influence, political system, illicit industries and domestic 
conflict. The Commission believes that the success or failure of the movements 
in this country towards peace achievement will bring consequences to the 
security of the entire region, but more specifically to Venezuela and Ecuador, 
its neighboring countries (Andes, 2004:4). It also considers that a major 
weakness of current American policy toward the region is to place too much 
emphasis on counter-narcotics and security issues, stemming from Plan 
Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative, and too little emphasis on 
‘complementary, comprehensive, regional strategies’.  
According to Andes 20-20, the countries in the region are either failing states 
or potentially failing ones. Therefore,    
 A qualitative change in policy toward the Andean Region is urgently 
 needed. Indeed, it is in the fundamental national security interest of 
 the United States to focus attention and action on the Andes, before a 
 regional collapse triggers explosive security and humanitarian crises 
 that demand a far deeper and more politically divisive commitment of 
 U.S. military and financial resources than the U.S. public and Congress 
 can tolerate (Andes, 15). 
Among the recommendations formulated, the Report of the Commission states 
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that political and economic resources assigned to the region, adding up to 
almost 700 million dollars per year, should be redistributed in a more 
equitable way to meet other priorities such as sustainable rural and border 
development. Also, political reforms that strengthen the rule of law and help 
consolidate democratic institutions are recommended. Regarding the drug 
problem, it proposes the development of a ‘multilateral multifaceted 
approach that combines financial incentives, broad international participation 
policy’ that also addresses the problem of demand in consumer countries 
(Andes, 2004:7) 
Finally, two more controversial recommendations included in the Report, given 
the current context of Colombia and the region are: 1) to amplify U.S. military 
training in Colombia and to increase the number of military personnel and of 
private military contractors permitted in Colombia, to struggle against 
terrorism, insurgency and drugs. This recommendation also proposes to update 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty. 
2) the negotiation of the Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), first with 
Colombia and Peru, and then with Ecuador and Bolivia, towards the 
achievement of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, (FTAA, Andes, 
2004:67).   
In the second of the two documents being examined here, General James T. 
Hill, then Chief of the South Command of the U.S, describes the panorama of 
the region in the following terms: 
 The security picture in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown 
 more complex over the past year. Colombia's considerable progress in 
 the battle against narco-terrorism is offset by negative developments 
 elsewhere in the region, particularly in Haiti, Bolivia, and Venezuela. 
 These developments represent an increasing threat to U.S. interests 
 (Hill, 2004). 
Hill goes on to claim that his country was confronting two types of threats in 
the Western Hemisphere: the traditional threat of narco-terrorism, on the one 
part, and the emerging threat of so-called radical populism, on the other. In a 
clear reference to the Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, he states:   
 Populism in and of itself is not a threat. Rather, the threat emerges 
 when it becomes radicalized by a leader who increasingly uses his 
 position and support from a segment of the population to infringe 
 gradually upon the rights of all citizens. This trend degrades 
 democracy and promises to concentrate power in the hands of a few 
 rather than guaranteeing the individual rights of the many. Anti-
 American sentiment has also been used to reinforce the positions of 
 radical leaders who seek to distract the populace from their own 
 shortcomings (…) The threats and trends in the region paint a negative 
 picture in many regards and certainly bear close scrutiny in the coming 
 year. We will maintain vigilance. We will also continue our work with 
 partner nations and the interagency to shore up stability and promote 
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 increasing security cooperation (Hill, 2004). 
Within the same document, Hill draws up a very positive portrait of President 
Uribe of Colombia and what he represents in the Andean context. He is 
mentioned as a ‘unique leader who has galvanized the will of the people and 
motivated his armed forces, [who] has personally demonstrated that one 
individual can change the course of events’, due to his personal leadership, 
energy, dedication and charisma. That is why ‘he is building the structures to 
sustain momentum and institutionalize success beyond that of his term and 
beyond that of Plan Colombia’ (Hill, 2004). 
General Hill concludes that the region, and especially Colombia, required 
increasing military attention in the following year. He presents a complete 
overview of the military involvement of the United States in Colombia, and of 
the importance of such an involvement for the region, in terms that merit 
reproducing at length: 
  We continue training the Counter Narcotics Brigade and its aviation 
 units. The Plan Colombia helicopters have proven to be a major asset 
 in the fight against narco-terrorism, and the procedures for 
 coordinating their use have been optimized and institutionalized […]
 We work on riverine techniques with the Colombian Marines and 
 have assisted in the establishment of operationally-focused Riverine 
 Combat Elements (RCE). We assisted in infrastructure security planning, 
 and ensured that all systems were in place to resume the State 
 Department-managed Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program. We are 
 working closely with Colombian Military Intelligence to assist them in 
 developing intelligence-driven operations. We sent Planning 
 Assistance Teams to support Colombian units in numerous locations 
 throughout Colombia. We helped develop Civil Affairs capabilities 
 that have been well used as the government re-established its official 
 presence in all municipalities. With funds made available from the 
 original FY 2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental, we have 
 helped the Colombian Ministry of Defense institute legal reforms 
 through the creation of a Military Penal Justice Corps (MPJC), similar 
 to our Judge Advocate General's Corps. To provide for the long-term 
 institutional health of the Colombian Army, we assisted them in 
 establishing a Command Sergeants Major Academy to develop a 
 robust non-commissioned officer corps. Finally, drawing on lessons 
 learned in our own operations, we are assisting in Colombian efforts 
 to strengthen inter-agency cooperation (Hill, 2004).  
 
III. The economic strategy of the US in the Andean Region 
The trade agreements with the US 
The US Doctrine of National Security is very clear regarding the priority of 
free-market policies. In this regard, the US has elaborated a comprehensive 
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strategy geared at achieving free-trade agreements with all the countries of 
the world, and mentions specifically the creation of the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), which was supposed to start working by the year 2005. 
By the same token, the document reaffirms Washington´s commitment  to work 
with the IMF, in order to ‘streamline the policy conditions for its lending and to 
focus its lending strategy on achieving economic growth through sound fiscal 
and monetary policy, exchange rate policy, and financial sector policy’ . 
According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative, trade has 
been critical for America´s prosperity by ‘fueling economic growth, supporting 
good jobs at home, raising living standards and helping Americans provide 
for their families with affordable goods and services’. During the last decade, 
trade has helped raise the Gross Domestic Product by nearly 40 percent. In 
the same document, it is stated that the two major trade agreements of the 
nineties, NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, have generated annual benefits 
between $1300 and $2000 for the average American family. It is also 
expected that if remaining global trade barriers are eliminated, the annual 
income of the US could improve by an additional $500 billion.  
Thus, regional and bilateral free-trade agreements are crucial for the United 
States. From 2001 on, the Bush administration has signed and put in place 
FTAs with Australia, Chile, Jordan, Morocco and Singapore. The US has also 
concluded negotiations in this regard with Bahrain, Central America and 
Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), Oman, Peru and Colombia.  Negotiations 
have started or are about to begin with the Republic of Korea, Panama, the 
five countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), Thailand, and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
For Carsten Fink and Patrick Reichenmiller, the increasing number of bilateral 
and regional FTAs pursued by the United States in various regions of the 
world, represents a considerable shift in the international diplomacy of the 
United States. In the past, the country relied mainly on multinational trade 
institutions to advance its economic and commercial interests. According to 
these authors, the strong pressure on Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) has to 
do with the importance of the exports of intangible assets, in which the US 
plays a leading role in the world. What follows is a synthesis of the main 
points the authors raise after comparing the IPRs disposition of some of these 
agreements: 
  a) Three of the agreements, US-Australia, US-Morocco and US-
Bahrain, extend the scope of patentability in order to apply to new uses of 
known products;  
 b) All bilateral agreements go beyond TRIPS in enhancing patent 
protection for plants and animals. In this regard, the strongest agreement is 
the one signed with Morocco, which explicitly contemplates the provision of 
patent protection for live species. The approved texts of CAFTA-DR and AFTA 
with Colombia and Peru call for ‘reasonable efforts’ by the parts to provide 
for patentability of plants;  
17 
 
 c) Although TRIPS claims for the use without limit of ‘compulsory 
licenses’ on the part of generic manufacturers, four of the bilateral 
agreements (Jordan, Vietnam, Singapore and Australia) limit the use of 
compulsory licensing to emergency situations, anti-trust remedies, and cases of 
public non-commercial use. This is also the case with CAFTA-DR and AFTA. 
Moreover, In order to make use of compulsory licenses, generic manufacturers 
need to obtain regulatory permission to enter the market, but, at the same 
time, some of the provisions approved in the bilateral agreements are an 
obstacle to this possibility. Most of these agreements prohibit the marketing 
approval for generics during the patent term without the consent of the patent 
holder. Additionally, obtaining marketing approval for generics requires the 
submission of test data regarding its safety and efficacy, which is restricted 
due to test data exclusivity;  
 d) Moreover, some of the agreements, such as the ones with Australia, 
Bahrain, DR-CAFTA and AFTA, go beyond this disposition, regarding data 
exclusivity. ‘In other words, test data exclusivity applies automatically in all 
FTA jurisdictions, once a company submits test data to a drug regulator in one 
territory – even outside the FTA area’. In addition, the agreements with 
Australia, Morocco and Singapore allow patent holders to prevent parallel 
imports through contractual means. 
Regarding the economic priorities contemplated in the National Security 
Strategy, two Andean countries, Colombia and Peru, have just agreed upon 
the signature of the AFTA with the United States. Amid social unrest, the 
Ecuadorian government has been delaying its signature. The negotiation of 
this agreement lasted less than two years (May 2004-February 2006), and 
started after the failure of the FTAA in 2003, when Brazil opposed the 
American project. During the negotiations of the AFTA, the two most 
controversial issues have been the agricultural subsidies and the intellectual 
property rights applied to the pharmaceutical sector, which have also been 
the most critical issues in the World Trade Organization since its beginning. 
Critics of the AFTA have emphasized that this accord is more an investment 
agreement than a trade one, insofar that it includes many key issues, such as 
intellectual property rights and oil-exploration and exploitation concessions, 
which go further trade matters. More over, the Andean agreement is stricter 
than the regulations of the World Trade Organization with regard to 
investment conditions and intellectual property rights protection. The AFTA is 
aimed at deepening the neoliberal strategy in the region, precisely in a 
moment in which the economies of the countries are devastated by such 
policies. The debt problem, an increasing social inequality, high levels of 
poverty and the political unrest are manifestations of such situation.  
 
B. The Colombian and the Peruvian Trade Promotion Agreements (CTPA 
and PTPA) in the context of the Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) 
According to the report of the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and 
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Negotiations (ACTPN) of the US, The Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement: 
 Fully meets the negotiating principles and objectives laid out in the 
 Trade Act of 2002, and is strongly in the interest of the United States. 
 It will level the playing field for America´s farmers and ranchers, 
 manufacturers, and service establishments. It will provide increased 
 market access for American goods and services.  
It also states the following: 
 The Colombian agreement meets or exceeds the negotiating 
 achievements of other recent agreements, including the Peru 
 agreement and the Central America-Dominican Republic agreement.  
 Very importantly, the agreement provides binding arbitration for 
 investor-state disputes that covers existing as well as prospective 
 investments. 
The trade relationship between the US and the Andean countries is significant. 
The total trade with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador was approximately $24 
billion in 2004. Exports from the US to these countries accounted for $8.3 
billion the same year and included machinery, organic chemicals, plastic, and 
cereals. Exports of agricultural products accounted for $1 billion. At the same 
time, goods imported from the three Andean countries totaled $15.3 billion in 
2004.  These countries represent a market of over $8 billion for US exports, 
and receive almost $8 billion in US foreign direct investment.  
Colombia is the second largest agricultural market for the United States in 
Latin America. According to Robert Portman, the United States Trade 
Representative, US goods exports to Colombia in 2005 were worth $5.4 
billion. Top export categories in 2005 were: machinery, organic chemicals, 
electrical machinery, and plastic. American exports of agricultural products to 
Colombia totaled $667 million in 2005. The main products include: coarse 
grains, wheat, cotton and soybeans. US foreign direct investment in Colombia 
was $3 billion in 2004, primarily concentrated in the manufacturing, mining 
and wholesale sectors.  
The negotiation of the AFTA with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador started in May 
2004 and came as a result of the failure of the FTAA and the deadlock in the 
Doha Development Round negotiations. The document presented by the 
United States from the first round held in May 2004 in the Colombian city of 
Cartagena, contemplated the extension of patent protection, over the terms 
approved in the WTO.  
When the negotiations of the agreement started, the Colombian government 
had given important steps regarding intellectual property protection. In 
October 2002, through Decree 2085, the government of Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
accepted the test data protection, one of the key issues under discussion in the 
AFTA. In this regard, the 2005 ‘Special 301’ Report states that Colombia still 
needs to make further improvements towards strengthening IP protection and 
therefore, the country was kept in the Watch List for 2005. However, it 
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recognizes that Colombia was the only Andean country to provide a full five 
years of data protection for pharmaceuticals.   
No doubt, the IP table was one of the most conflictive of all. Given the 
intransigence and the arrogance of the American negotiation team, two 
members of the Colombian team resigned from the negotiation table in 
September 2005, stating that the IP provisions negotiated in the FTA were the 
result of a political rather than a technical decision. Shortly after, the technical 
team from the Peruvian Health Ministry also withdrew from the negotiation. 
During the negotiations, the US imposed veto to José Maria Correa, who was 
working as a consultant in the negotiations for the three Andean countries.  
The key thing is that the US never formally replied to any of the proposals 
and objections that the Andean countries presented at the negotiating table. 
Strong pressure from the representatives of the pharmaceutical multinationals, 
represented by AFIDRO, was apparent throughout the negotiations. They 
openly participated as members of the Colombian negotiating team. 
According to figures provided by Oxfam, the AFTA was adopted in a context 
of extreme unequal economic relations between the countries. The United 
States is an important market for these countries and accounts for 42 per cent 
of exports and 26.6 per cent of imports. By contrast, the Andean countries 
together account for less than 1 per cent of total US trade volume.  
Thus, the American negotiators were able to impose new, harsh protection 
measures regarding intellectual property rights. Some of there are the 
extension of the life of patents and exclusive use of test data. ‘These measures 
would increase the monopoly rights of transnational pharmaceutical 
companies and limit competition and access to affordable generic medicines 
in the Andean countries’. 
As an official document from the US government acknowledges, the FTAs with 
Colombia and Peru make a number of significant improvements regarding IPR 
protection. The agreement stipulates the restoration of patent terms, in order 
to compensate for delays in the granting of the original patent; limits the 
ground for revoking patents; clarifies that test data and trade secrets 
submitted to the government office for a product approval will be provided 
with protection against unfair commercial use for a period of five years for 
pharmaceuticals and 10 years for agricultural chemical products; and, 
requires a system to prevent the marketing of pharmaceutical products that 
infringe patents. In Oxfam´s view, the provisions agreed upon in AFTA 
regarding intellectual property rights protection, are even more restrictive 
than those contained in CAFTA, ‘despite the fact that Andean negotiators from 
each country´s health ministry went to considerable lengths to oppose them’. 
Throughout the negotiation process, the Colombian and the Peruvian 
governments insisted that the public-health interests were being properly 
protected. In public debates about the topic, government officials constantly 
refer to some commitments contemplated by the two parties in bilateral 
letters. However, these letters are not part and parcel of the agreement and, 
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therefore, are not mandatory. As a case in point, in one of those letters of one 
page (four paragraphs), the two governments state that  
 The obligations of Chapter Sixteen of the Agreement do not affect the 
 Party´s ability to take necessary measures to protect public health by 
 promoting access to medicines for all, in particular concerning cases 
 such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics as well 
 as circumstances of extreme urgency or national emergency. 
In another side letter, referred to in the same Chapter, it is stated that 
Colombia and Peru will  
 Take the measures to expeditiously process patent applications that 
 have been pending for a significant period of time…Colombia shall 
 accomplish this by, among other measures, significantly increasing 
 the number of patent examiners and enhancing examination training 
 for patent examiners.  
Critics to provisions on intellectual property protection and medical products 
contemplated in the Andean trade agreement have flowed from various 
organizations, well before the agreements were signed. Some reports from 
international organizations and NGOs have given alerts about the 
implications of the dispositions of the AFTA regarding the protection of the 
pharmaceutical multinationals. All of them coincide in the fact that the price of 
the products will severely increase and the access to medication by the 
people will be reduced, if the agreement with the US is signed.  
The Pan American Health Organization, PAHO, sponsored a study on the 
potential impact of the TRIP-plus provisions contained in the AFTA. According 
to this study conducted by Ifarma, intellectual property rights give market 
exclusivity, which allows for higher prices than the ones resulting from 
competitive conditions. These higher prices will have a decisive impact on the 
access of the population to prescribed drugs and this is especially true for 
developing countries. The study states that the expense in these drugs by the 
homes is highly regressive in two aspects: first, disease tends to become more 
frequent and severe in low-income sectors, increasing their needs of 
medicines; and second, the population has to invest a higher portion of their 
income to buy medicines. The same document states that protection of test 
data in Colombia, resulting from Decree 2085 of 2002, would have an 
impact calculated to total 280 million dollars in year 2010, which accounts for  
non-access to medicines for almost 400,000 persons. The study concludes that 
by the year 2020 the Colombian health system would have to pay an 
additional $940 million per year to cover the growing cost of medicines and 
that approximately 6 million people would have no access to medicines.  
Following the same report, the incorporation of intellectual property principles 
in the CTPA, such as the increasing spectrum of patentability, will have an 
effect on the General System of Social Security in Health, equal to 6,6 
percent in the year 2008, only to maintain the same provision of medicines. 
This could mean the exit from the system of approximately 300,000 persons. 
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This same provision will produce a negative impact on home expenses, and 
the increment in cost resulting from the agreement will be higher for the 
poorest people, who will have to assume up to 22,28  percent of the total 
increase, whereas the richest will have to pay for the 4,67 percent.  
In the midst of the implementation of Decree 2085 and of the negotiation of 
the trade agreement with the US, the Colombian Government has insisted on 
the modification of Decision 486 which regulates the Common Industrial 
Property Regime of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). This Decision 
was the result of a common approach, adopted by the Andean countries 
during the early nineties, in order to incorporate IP provisions and WTO 
commitments. Colombia and Peru, the two Andean countries that signed the 
AFTA, were forced to ratify or adopt the UPOV 91 Convention, which 
stipulates an extension of IP rights to ‘discovering’ plant varieties. This means 
the application of IP rights for no innovations. 
Finally, the organization Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without Borders 
submitted a letter to Robert Zoellick, in response to the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) request for Public Comments on the 
United States-Andean Free Trade Agreement (FTA), dated March 24, 2004, 
which states the following: 
 We call upon USTR to abandon immediately “Trips-plus” negotiating 
 objectives and to negotiate the US-Andean Agreement in keeping with 
 the spirit and letter of the Doha Declaration, which the US adopted 
 along with all other WTO members in November 2001. In order to 
 ensure that countries, including the US, uphold that commitment in good 
 faith, we must recommend that intellectual property provisions be 
 excluded from the final US-Andean Agreement altogether. 
According to the same organization, ‘If the FTAA creates a system that blocks 
the use of equivalent but cheaper drugs, it will be a catastrophe for all 
people in the Americas, because the difference in price can be the difference 
between life and death’ and concludes: 
 As a medical humanitarian organization, we cannot accept the 
 subordination of the health needs of our patients and millions of others 
 to US trade interests. In order to ensure the protection of public health 
 and the promotion of access to medicines for all, we therefore must 
 recommend that intellectual property provisions be excluded from the 
 US-Andean Agreement altogether. 
 
C.   The myth of foreign investment 
In neo-liberal thought, foreign investment is conceived of as the only path to 
generate economic and social development and, thus, to create jobs. 
Therefore, in order to make countries more attractive to foreign investors, 
especially those related to labor conditions, reforms have to be undertaken. 
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Such argument is very well expressed in these trade agreements. 
Nevertheless, recent experiences of Latin American countries in this regard 
make it clear that this idea does not correspond to reality. From various 
perspectives, reports from international organizations, such as the 
International Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and ECLAC, have 
agreed on the acknowledgement of the increasing concentration of wealth, 
the increment of poverty and the deterioration of job quality and working 
conditions, from the nineties on in Latin America, precisely when the amounts of 
foreign investment increased. On the contrary, the historical experience of the 
most industrialized countries shows that the path followed by them to achieve 
development conditions was the adoption of precise state politics, in order to 
consolidate national sovereignty and the domestic market.   
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by multinationals increased notoriously in Latin 
America, in the context of generalized privatization policies during the 
nineties. This type of investment was fundamental in the recovering of the US 
economy during the past decade. As a matter of fact, in only one year, 1997, 
the operations of the American companies in the region generated 20,000 
billion dollars in net utilities, a figure that accounted for 19.9 percent of total 
net utilities obtained by overseas subsidiaries of the US companies, according 
to figures provided by the United States Trade Representative office.  
Nevertheless, given that the privatization process is almost concluded in 
Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America, perspectives of foreign investment 
in the region are uncertain, to say the least. According to a report by OCDE 
(Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development), in 2003 there 
was a considerable increase in FDI of multinationals in the developing 
economies of faster development in the world, whereas it dropped for the 
second consecutive year in Latin America. Another report by ECLAC states that 
foreign investment in the region dropped 19 percent in 2003. The case of 
Colombia was more dramatic, with a drop of 34 percent and only 4 percent 
of the total amount of investment for the region. Thus, in Latin America as a 
whole, FDI shifted from 44,979 million dollars in 2002 to 36,500 in 2003. As 
it was stated above, the explanation given for this drop is the end of the 
boom of privatizations.  
In the year 2005 there was again an increase of FDI in Latin America, 
reaching 68,000 million dollars, a figure 11 percent higher than the previous 
year. However, according to ECLAC, it is clear that the region is steadily 
losing participation in the world influxes and international competitiveness. 
What is more important, during the past two decades, a trend to invest in non 
productive sectors or to acquire state companies, has been apparent. This 
strategy on the part of foreign multinationals does not generate new jobs. On 
the contrary, the liquidation and privatization of state companies has been 
accompanied by the elimination of thousands of jobs, especially in the 
industrial sector. In the case of Colombia, official figures registered an 
increase of FDI of 227 percent for the year 2005. However, as the report 
states, this increase corresponds to the selling of the country´s main brewery, 
Bavaria, to SABMiller, and other important companies that were sold to 
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international capital.   
Finally, in a recent report by UNCTAD, it is stated that global flows of FDI 
reached $1.2 trillion in 2006, directed mainly to developed countries, such as 
the US, the United Kingdom and France. ‘The US recovered its position as the 
largest single host country for FDI in the world’, and the European Union 
accounted for about 45 percent of the total FDI inflows in the same year. At 
the same time, inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean slowed down in 
2006. Flows to Colombia fell by 52 percent.  According to a report by the 
United States International Trade Commission, the US is the largest destination 
of FDI in the world, with $1.5 trillion in 2004.    
 
IV. Overview of an alternative project for regional integration: ALBA- TCP 
During the past five years, Bolivarian Revolution has experienced a process of 
radicalization, not only in terms of the political discourse of its leader, Hugo 
Chávez, but also regarding its domestic social policies and its regional and 
international policy. As a case in point, as part and parcel of the project of 
Socialism for the 21nd Century, the government announced its retirement from 
the IMF and the World Bank, stating that the country does not need those 
institutions. However, this paper will refer only to the main components of its 
policy for an alternative regional integration.  
The project known as the Bolivarian Alternative for the People of Our 
Americas (ALBA is its acronym in Spanish), was initiated by Cuba and 
Venezuela in Havana on December 14, 2004. It is a number of social, 
economic and cultural agreements for fair trade and non exclusive 
relationships between Latin American and Caribbean nations. The project 
goes beyond trade, and includes ambitious developmental projects, such as: 
Latin American plans for free health care and an education scholarship 
programme; the creation of a Social Emergency Fund; a regional 
communication network system which includes ‘TeleSUR’ (Television from the 
south); a Development Bank of the South; and a regional petroleum company.  
In May 2006, during a meeting with the president of Bolivia and the vice-
president of Cuba, in Chapare, Bolivia, the Venezuelan leader presented its 
basis. On the same occasion, the Bolivian president, Evo Morales, summarised  
the main principles of the People´s Trade Agreement (TCP is its acronym in 
Spanish). In his speech, Chávez characterized the situation of the Andean 
Region in the international context as follows: 
 The neoliberal imperialism, the superior phase of capitalism, has 
 reached the phase of madness. Therefore, Latin American peoples 
 have to do away with imperialism in this century, in order to save the 
 world. Socialism is the path for the redemption of people, to true 
 liberation, equality and justice.  
Nicaragua joined ALBA in January 2007. And soon it was expected that 
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Ecuador’ president elect Rafael Correa would become the 5th ALBA country 
with full membership.  
But the only differentiation was not only with the bilateral and regional 
agreements imposed by the United States in the region. The ALBA project 
talso distances itself from other regional agreements, such as CAN (Andean 
Community of Nations) and Mercosur (Common South American Market), given 
that the ALBA seeks to go beyond trade and to develop new principles and 
values for the relationship among nations, such as cooperation, solidarity and 
economic complementarity:  
 Martí used to say that the term ´radical´ stems from root; we should 
 be radicals, because we must return to our roots, to the profound roots 
 of the indigenous, black, mixed America. That is the way we are 
 radicals, and, therefore, today more than ever, more alive than ever, 
 men and women who gave birth to the most important civilization that 
 existed, the Incas.   
 However, to practical terms: Chávez has approximated Mercosur and retired 
from the CAN. On October 8th, 2005, the four governments of the founder- 
countries of this agreement approved the admission of Venezuela as a full 
member, after Chávez developed a process of rapprochement to their 
leaders, who are closer to his political project. However, more recently, in late 
June 2007, the Brazilian Congress did not ratify this admission. In April, 2006, 
when the governments of Colombia and Peru had already concluded their 
bilateral trade agreement negotiations with the United States, Venezuela 
announced its withdrawal from the CAN. 
 The creation of Petroamérica, conceived of as a project for energy 
integration of all the countries of the continent, based on the principles of 
solidarity and complementarity ‘in the just and democratic use of resources 
towards the development of the countries’, can be understood in the context 
of ALBA. Three regional initiatives of energy integration make up this project: 
Petrosur, Petrocaribe and the Andean Community of Nations. It is aimed at 
achieving the sovereign use of energy resources as an engine of endogenous 
development. In the same vein, the integration of energy companies from Latin 
America and the Caribbean, in order to make joint investments in exploration, 
exploitation and commercialization of oil and natural gas, is contemplated.    
 After referring to the main components of ALBA, a synthesis of the principles 
of the PTA, conceived of by the Bolivian government, will be presented. It 
reflects the demands made historically by the Bolivian social movements. The 
TCP openly questions the current trade regime, given the fact that all the 
developed countries became prosperous by protecting nascent industries 
behind trade barriers. The main concepts on which it is based are the 
following:  
 1) It is presented as a response to the exhaustion of the neoliberal 
model of development and to its central strategies;  
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 2) trade and investment are not considered as ends but as means of 
development: It establishes a new foundation for trade based on the 
conviction that ‘strong solidarity, mutual cooperation and aid between their 
peoples must prevail, free from any interest in business or market profits’;  
 3) It promotes an integral model of integration among peoples, that 
limits and regulates foreign investors and multinationals;  
 4) The State has the right to subordinate trade agreements to the 
interests of national development and to use protectionist measures to achieve 
this project; Thus, it does not prohibit the use of mechanisms for supporting 
industrialization or for protecting the domestic market;  
 5) It recognizes the right of people to determine their own agricultural 
and alimentary policies;  
 6) It considers that vital services should be provided exclusively by 
public enterprises, regulated and managed by the state;  access to water and 
basic services from the people are placed before the rights of multinational 
companies;  
 7) Trade agreements should be based on solidarity and 
complementarily rather than competition and overexploitation;  
 8) It proposes a different logic for the relationships among human 
beings, a different model of living together, not based on competitiveness and 
eagerness of accumulation; thus,  trade agreements should protect small 
community-based enterprises; instead, the new project defends a logic based 
on ‘a distinct model of co-existence’, a principle stemming from a deeply-
rooted idea of ‘Pachamama’ in the Andean cosmo-vision, which says that, as 
part of creation, people need to live in harmony with nature.  Clearly, the PTA 
also questions the un-sustainability of ‘economic growth’ and the Western 
culture of waste which ‘measures the development of a country based on the 
capacity of its population to consume.’ It encourages the formation of joint 
companies which give priority to ‘initiatives which strengthen the capacity for 
social inclusion, resource industrialization and food security, in a framework of 
respect and preservation of the environment.’   
 Shortly after the announcement of this project, Bolivia signed a People’s 
Trade Agreement with Cuba and Venezuela as a ‘means toward development 
with social justice in the framework of genuine fraternal Latin American and 
Caribbean integration.’  The concretization of ALBA and TCP started with the 
subscription of various strategic agreements between the three countries, 
including Cuba, which refer to different sectors. It was stipulated that the 
development of such agreement will be under the control of the national 
states. 
Venezuela offered both technical assistance and substantial investments in 
Bolivia’s hydrocarbons sector, through four projects which represented 1.500 
million dollars. They include the construction of petrochemical plant and one of 
GTL (Gas To Liquids). Pdvsa, the Venezuela state oil company, was  to 
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additionally invest 800 million dollars in exploration and exploitation of 
hydrocarbons. These agreements imply the constitution of mixed societies with 
YPFB, the Bolivian state company, in which the latter will have the 51 per cent 
and the Venezuelan company the 49 per cent. In the mining sector, the two 
countries co-formed the state mixed company Minera del Sur (Minsur). 
In the agricultural sector, Venezuela plans to invest more than 23 million 
dollars in various projects in Oruro, Potosí, Ben, Pando and La Paz. One of 
these projects is a plant in Chapare to industrialise the leaf of coke and of 
other industries, such as quinua, textiles, dairy products, tourism, honey and 
leather. Most significantly, Venezuela will buy Bolivian agricultural exports 
including all the soya-beans that will not be acquired by Colombia after its 
trade agreement with the US starts working.   
It is expected that these cooperation agreements will produce a significant 
social impact. It is calculated that in the agricultural and textile sectors 
together more than 230 000 new jobs could be generated. Cuba offered its 
cooperation program in health and education. In the first sector, there are 
already 700 experts working in Bolivia. In addition, 20 hospitals provided 
with high technology were donated, as well as 6 ophthalmologic centers, 
which have the ability to operate on 100,000 people every year. At the 
same time, a literacy program was set in motion and 6 000 scholarships 
where available to study medicine in Cuba. According to Manuel Morales 
Olivera, advisor to YPFB, with these agreements, Bolivia initiated a new 
historical period, one in which it will no longer be a ‘beggar state’, counting 
on new possibilities for development. 
The Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez stated that ALBA was a project 
against the FTAA pushed by the United States in the region, which was 
confronted by strong popular rejection. He also said that the TCP was against 
the FTA signed by this country with some Latin American countries. Thus, ‘while 
the FTAA is a response to the interests of transnational capital and looks for 
the complete liberalization of trade in goods, services and investments, ALBA 
emphasizes the struggle against poverty and social exclusion, and, therefore 
represents the interests of the Latin American people’. For his part, Evo 
Morales stated the following in the above-mentioned meeting in Chapare: 
 This agreement represents a step forward in the aspirations of 
 changing the neoliberal system that dominates the continent, as well 
 as an impulse to the process of decolonization experienced by 
 Bolivia…it represents, in addition, the encounter of three generations, 
 three revolutions which seek to deepen still more, three people that 
 work for improving their friendship.   
As a concrete expression of this new policy of regional integration, the 1st 
South American Energy Summit was celebrated in Margarita Island, 
Venezuela, on April 16 and 17, 2007, with the participation of the Presidents 
or prime ministers of 12 countries of the region. According to Chavez, who 
promoted the meeting, its purpose was to unify efforts to overcome poverty 
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and the existent asymmetries in the region. It was stated that the creation of 
the Energy Union of South America consolidated the agreements in the areas 
of health, education, industry, agrarian and mining sectors, with the objective 
of advancing to a multi-polar world. ‘Energy transforms itself in cooperation 
agreements in various areas, breaking with traditional schemes of commerce 
that only favor the oligarchies and the empire. Today, South American 
peoples are the ones who write their history, big and sovereign.’ 
Finally, from the review of the principles on which ALBA and TCP are based, 
as well as of the agreements that were signed and the declarations of the 
presidents of the two countries, it is clear that they represent alternatives to 
the principles of the trade agreements negotiated by the U.S. or the principles 
that rule the WTO. The above projects place emphasis on policies that go 
against the neo-liberal strategy: Strengthening of the economic and social 
role of the state, state control of natural resources and of strategic public 
services and companies, protection of the domestic market, control of foreign 
investment and its subordination to the priorities of national development, as 
well as strong social investment. Some of these principles represent a return to 
the CEPAL-ECLA ideas, while others, such as vindication of national 
sovereignty, point out to a more advanced project. Principles of regional 
integration, such as complementarity, solidarity and cooperation among 
countries go against current rules of international trade established by the 
most powerful countries.   
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